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The Problem 
Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) obtained its independence from Britain in 
1948. It is a multi-racial island, southeast of the Indian sub-continent, with 
the Sinhalese constituting 72 percent of the population, the Sri Lankan 
Tamils 11.2 percent, the Tamils of recent Indian origin (referred to as In-
dian Tamils) 9.3 and the Muslims, the majority of whom are Tamil-
speaking 7.1 percent.1 On occasion, the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Indian 
Tamils unite for limited political purposes. The Tamil-speaking Muslims 
rarely combine with the Tamils. The Sri Lankan Tamils came as invaders 
or settlers from neighbouring empires in the South Indian mainland from 
prehistoric times to around 1070 A.D. and settled in a contiguous area of 
territory in the northern and eastern parts of the island. They established 
their own kingdom there which endured till around 1621 when the Por-
tuguese occupied this kingdom as well as sections of the Sinhalese 
kingdom in the maritime areas of southwest Sri Lanka. Therein lie the 
beginnings of what is contemporaneously called the Sinhalese-Tamil 
problem. 
Under British rule, the island was welded into a single administrative 
whole and Sri Lankan Tamils spread into the Sinhalese-speaking districts 
in search of employment in the public and private sectors as well as for 
commerce. Large numbers of the Sri Lankan Tamils live in the Sinhalese-
speaking districts today and they are a trapped minority being hostages to 
fortune whenever racial disturbances occur as they have in 1956, 1958, 
1961, 1966, 1975, 1977, 1979 and 1981. The historic enmity between the 
two races is invoked on such occasions. 
The Indian Tamils live in housing in the plantations which are mostly in 
the central and south-central districts. They are an island unto themselves 
but get dragged into these conflicts. A good few of them are either 
stateless or citizens of India. The Sinhalese view them suspiciously as a 
Tamil Fifth Column and, sometimes, inarticulately, as the equivalent of 
the Sudeten Germans. A problem lies in that the government of India is 
concerned for the safety of these Indian Tamils when there is racial con-
flict. 
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At the time Britian was planning on independence for the island, the Sri 
Lankan Tamils conducted a great agitation for balanced representation in 
the legislature (fifty per cent of the seats for the Sinhalese majority and the 
remaining fifty per cent for the Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils and 
Muslims) through their principal political instrument, the All-Ceylon 
Tamil Congress.2 They failed to persuade Whitehall. After independence, 
the Sri Lankan Tamils, now under the spell of a rival political party, the 
Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi escalated their demands. Their leadership 
wished to convert the existing unitary constitution to a federalist one. They 
dwelt on their historic homelands and they harked back to the days of the 
Tamil kingdom of the pre-Portuguese period. The party's Tamil and 
English names left room for manoeuvre, the party claiming in the Tamil 
language to represent the ideal of a Ceylon Tamil state (the English 
translation of its Tamil name being exactly this — the Ceylon Tamil State 
Party) while in English it designated itself as the Federal Freedom Party of 
the Tamil-speaking peoples. 
The Federal Party's charismatic leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam (the 
father-in-law of this writer) negotiated three agreements with Sri Lankan 
prime ministers or their representatives, in 1957, 1960 and 1965, basically 
compromises on the federalist solution. The prime ministers concerned 
could not honour these owing to strong pressure from militant Sinhalese 
Buddhist groupings. The Sri Lankan Tamil leadership for their part 
launched campaigns of non-cooperation and civil disobedience in 1956, 
1958 and 1961 and refused to be party to the autochthonous constitutions 
of 1972 and 1978 (the independence constitution was British-imposed). 
Given the Federal Party's campaign in the Tamil language for a Ceylon 
Tamil state, the party found no difficulty to switch to a demand for a 
separate sovereign state.3 During 1973-1976, there was a general 
coalescence of Tamil political groupings under the umbrella title of Tamil 
United Front (1972), later changed to the Tamil United Liberation Front 
(1976). In 1976, the Front at its first national convention, resolved to 
launch a non-violent campaign for a sovereign Tamil state to be named 
Tamil Eelam. The non-violent character of the movement could not be 
maintained for long. In April 1977, the Front's leader, a persistent ad-
vocate of non-violence died after a long illness. Since then, there have been 
incidents of sporadic violence, indicating sophistication in the use of 
weaponry and explosives. Soldiers, policemen and Tamil collaborators in 
the Tamil-speaking north have been killed by Tamil militants. The army 
and police have been violent in the north and action and counter-action 
have brought the island to. a state of near civil war. The ever present 
danger, at any time, of a flashpoint situation is now a perennial fact of 
political life in the island. 
The deterioration in Sinhala-Tamil relations began with laws dis-
franchising the Indian Tamil population in 1948-1949 by a post-
independent Sri Lankan government. In 1956, the Sinhala language was 
made the one official language throughout the island. Its effects have not 
been meaningfully mitigated by subsequent provisions in legislation and 
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constitutional clauses for "the reasonable use of the Tamil language" in 
1958, 1972 and 1978. The Sri Lankan Tamils complain bitterly of dis-
crimination in favour of the Sinhalese in public appointments, admissions 
to the state-run universities and in respect of settlement of the landless in 
state sponsored colonisation schemes in the Tamil-speaking north and east 
of Sri Lanka. 
At the general election of 1977, the Tamil United Liberation Front was 
returned as the largest opposition group in Parliament. By virtue of 
parliamentary convention, the Front's new leader, Appapillai 
Amirthalingam, emerged as Leader of the official Opposition. The posi-
tion gave the Front tremendous opportunities. Amirthalingam, now a 
seasoned campaigner, having developed through a period of more than 
thirty years under the tutelage of the late Tamil leader, S.J.V. 
Chelvanayakam, did not fail to exploit the situation to advance the claim 
for a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam at home and more abroad. Extremely 
articulate and persuasive, Amirthalingam had a ready audience in his in-
ternational travels. He claimed that his Front had won the general election 
on the mandate for a separate state it had asked for from the Tamil-
speaking peoples of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. 
The new right-of-centre government headed by J.R. Jayewardene, 
Prime Minister 1977-1978 and Executive President thereafter, committed 
as it was to an open economy and the attraction of foreign investment and 
aid from the states of the western world found itself embarrassed especially 
in view of the wide coverage given in the international press to 
Amirthalingam's utterances and to the Sinhala-Tamil problem. The situa-
tion was compounded by the escalating violence by Tamil militants and 
police and army personnel in the north. Widespread racial disturbances in 
1977 worsened matters. The government of J.R. Jayewardene was not cer-
tain of the loyalty of the security forces, the latter having been extensively 
infiltrated by supporters of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Sinhala 
Buddhist-oriented United Front government during the years 1970-1977.4 
By 1978-79, the government faced a crisis because of the Tamil powder 
keg. There was need for immediate remedial action. President 
Jayewardene was unable to communicate with the Liberation Front's 
parliamentary leadership or to have a meaningful dialogue with them. A 
mediator-negotiator-intermediary had to emerge if the inevitable disaster 
was to be averted. 
The Requirements for an Intermediary 
Sri Lankan society is like most societies pyramidal in structure. 
Political transactions therefore invariably take place at the top and then 
find their way to the middle and base layers through usually members of 
Parliament and party faithfuls. The island's English-educated middle class 
has a heightened consciousness especially because politics is closely in-
terwoven with economic policies. A distinct feature is that this middle 
class is quite intimate with what goes on among themselves. Its members 
too must therefore be given the appearance that there is consultation and 
communication with them on political matters. It is in this way that 
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democratic and élitist participation is enlisted in the political process. The 
intermediary must therefore be known to, and must command the respect 
and attention of, the top and middle layers. I had that advantage. 
The fact that I was away in a foreign (Canadian) university appeared to 
provide a romanticizing effect, distance lending enchantment to the view. 
Above all the isolation was reassuring to the actors in the arena. The in-
termediary would not want to compete in the gladiatorial contest. Further-
more a professor of political science (such as myself) is regarded in a dif-
ferent way from professors in other disciplines. Such a professor is ex-
pected to be aware of what goes on in the political world and to have solu-
tions at hand for the pressing problems that beset the country. Partly this 
arises from the fact that the political scientist is confused with a con-
stitutional lawyer. Be that as it may, the political scientist of senior rank-
ing is like the medieval medicine man. And people at the apex are willing 
to give him a ready ear and listen to him. A society like that of Sri Lanka 
also treats inhabitants of the ivory tower with awe. 
There is a benefit in being known to the contending parties. I was in 
close touch with the President of the Republic (J.R. Jayewardene) when he 
was in opposition. I had advised him on questions relating to the Gaullist-
style constitution of 1978 of which the President had been the principal 
architect. I am also a friend of the leader of the Liberation Front, Appapil-
lai Amirthalingam, from university days and was intimately acquainted 
with five other senior parliamentary members of the Front. The Front and 
its leaders were reinforced in their confidence in me because I am the son-
in-law of their late charismatic leader and had been the latter's unofficial 
political and constitutional confidant/consultant during a period of some 
thirty years. 
In a context in which the President of the Republic and the leaders of the 
Liberation Front were locked in mortal combat, there seemed no better 
person to act initially the role of a go-between. The stark fact of an ethnic 
explosion was staring them in the face. Between the President and the 
Front lay a seemingly unbridgeable gap. The President had endeavoured 
to initiate a dialogue with the Front's leaders. They would talk "nicely" to 
him (the President stated to this writer) and then go back and do just as 
they pleased. The Front complained similarly. The President they said 
professed good intentions but was not willing to make any tangible moves 
towards resolving the problems facing their people. He (the President) was 
inflexible on the question of a sovereign state or of even a compromise on 
it. He had devised a system of district ministers for each of the twenty-four 
administrative districts into which the islands divided, six of these being in 
the Tamil-speaking areas, but these ministers were more the agents of an 
Executive President than instruments for the decentralisation and devolu-
tion of central government powers. They did not draw their power from 
the people of the area nor were they accountable to them or their 
parliamentary representatives. 
At first I had reservations of assuming the role. Preliminary discussions 
with the leader of the Liberation Front indicated rigidity on the question of 
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seulement of Sinhalese colonists in the historic homelands of the Sri 
Lankan Tamils. I was besides short of time as I had to return to my duties 
at the University of New Brunswick (Canada). In August 1978 therefore, I 
put into operation an alternative scheme. I secured the services of five 
prominent Tamil professional men (a banker, two former supreme court 
judges, a retired head of civil service, and one of the country's best civil 
lawyers) and intimated to the President of the Republic and the leader of 
the Liberation Front that this group of five was willing to act as mediators 
in the dispute. I then left for Canada. 
The group failed to make headway. They were inexperienced in the ways 
of politicians. They were neither enterprising nor were they bold or daring 
or innovative; they lacked the capacity to persuade. They could not create 
the necessary confidence among the leaders of the Liberation Front. And 
the President was not willing to shift his ground because this group of 
professional men could not come up with a concrete alternative. In the end 
it was left to me (the political scientist) to take on the role of intermediary, 
problem-solver and confidant of the President and leader of the Opposi-
tion. But this required enormous self-discipline. In an intimate and in-
quisitive social set up as in Sri Lanka, it is difficult to keep things com-
partmentalised. The better policy was to be discreet if not tight lipped. 
It is not easy for an intermediary to maintain an equilibrium in a highly 
volatile set up where today's undertakings and agreements could become 
worthless on the morrow. And this is all the more a reason for anxiety. 
Failure could result in the accusation that I had raised expectations which 
I could not satisfy. A sinking feeling therefore often seized me, the view 
that all was not working out well, the doubts and the gnawing con-
sciousness that an impasse could exasperate a people (the Tamil-speaking) 
already in the depths of despair. At a certain stage when the exercise did 
not appear to make progress, I seriously considered abandoning my role 
only to be told by the leader of the Liberation Front (Appapillai 
Amirthalingam) that I should intimate to the President of the Republic 
(President Jayewardene) that it was because of him (the President) that I 
had been drawn into this exercise. The President of the Liberation Front 
(M. Sivasithamparam) for his part remarked: "We had no hope before 
you appeared on the scene; so the situation will remain unchanged when 
you depart the scene." But Sivasithamparam was emphatic in his assertion 
that the Front would launch a struggle, come what may, to achieve their 
objective. President Jayewardene for his part was always on top of things. 
His hopes never flagged. He was confident that a solution could be 
produced. 
An intermediary must therefore not function in a singular capacity. The 
support and encouragement of one or two close friends is always helpful 
especially when things appear to go awry. There were two such persons in 
Sri Lanka ready at hand — a university professor of history (Dr. K.M. de 
Silva) and the son of a dear friend (now deceased), Dr. Neelan 
Tiruchelvam. The latter indeed became my alter ego. There were besides 
two ambassadors from friendly states who were very supportive; they 
urged me to hang in. They, in their turn, also talked to the President of the 
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Republic. A high official from the embassy of an influential Communist 
state tried to keep in touch with Dr. Tiruchelvam. At a later date, I met 
with the ambassador of this Communist state and he clearly outlined his 
country's position in the Sinhala-Tamil dispute. He was for an amicable 
settlement. He did not wish foreign powers to get involved. 
To be away in Canada and to commute from there from time to time 
had its distinct advantages. A continuing presence could result in all man-
ner of demands being made on me. The two parties to the dispute were be-
ing pressured by their respective constituents. Attempts were made by the 
high command of the party to which the President of the Republic 
belonged to water down the solution; the President however kept to his un-
dertakings. On the other side, the lieutenants of the leader of the Libera-
tion Front wanted me to insist on further concessions. An interminable 
dialogue would then have ensued. It was better therefore to secure agree-
ment on the main outlines and withdraw from the scene. I could make the 
long distance phone call if there was bad faith or misinterpretation 
resulting from misunderstandings. There were many such occasions. And 
it was possible to iron out problems that way more effectively than if I 
were physically present in the island of sorrows. There were letters too sent 
from time to time. One such letter from the President of the Republic ex-
pressed deep distress in regard to controversial statements made by some 
of the Front's leaders. I then wrote to the Leader of the Liberation Front 
urging him and his colleagues to be more cautious and was reassured ac-
cordingly. The Front too complained to me about statements made by the 
President of the Republic and I brought these to the latter's attention. 
Absence from the scene had also a further advantage. In an intimate 
society it is difficult to resist the importunities of intimates. The invariable 
request for a favour which could only be dispensed by a cabinet minister or 
by the President of the Republic himself was made from time to time, es-
pecially for transfers, promotions, early retirements in the public services. 
One's currency would be lost if one were involved in such petty trifles. 
Guidelines 
In seeking to devise a solution acceptable to the two parties, I felt I must 
observe certain guidelines. The formula must be so designed as to serve the 
interests of the contenders. There was a responsibility to the President of 
the Republic, for in the prevailing Sinhalese-Tamil conflict his political 
rivals should not have opportunities of accusing him or his party of 
knuckling down to the threats of the Tamil United Liberation Front. Ac-
count had to be taken of the fact that the leaders of the Liberation Front 
were in an equally, if not more precarious position; they had whipped up 
world opinion (the international press, the Tamils of South India and the 
expatriate Sri Lankan Tamils) for their cause; they had mobilised the mas-
sive support of the Sri Lankan Tamils at home; the charge would be level-
led that they had caused a setback to the galloping momentum of the 
separatist movement if at this stage they entered into negotiations which 
would give them anything short of their demand for a separate Tamil 
sovereign state of Eelam. Herein lay the probability of an impasse. 
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Further, Article 2 of the Sri Lanka Constitution (1978) of which the 
President himself was the principal architect declared Sri Lanka to be a 
unitary state and Article 83 requires that any such proposal to amend be 
confirmed by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of Parliament 
and approved by the people at a referendum. This is a hurdle that can 
never be crossed; for the Sinhalese electors who are in a majority will not 
be party to the "division" of a country which they regard as their own. 
I was therefore confronted with a nearly insoluble situation; the 
deadlock could only be resolved by my taking on the sole burden of 
proposing a design which will not interfere with the unitary character of 
the state, which at the same time would also provide a measure of 
autonomy and decentralisation for the Tamil-speaking areas. I would have 
to exploit my experience as a political scientist to lend that weight to the 
scheme. The Liberation Front could then claim that it was not a conces-
sion to their demand for a separate sovereign state but a device which 
provided some of its basics. 
The President of the Republic for his part should be able to declare that 
the arrangement gave him the right to exercise full control over the 
autonomous bodies — and that it was possible to do this through his 
agents in the district, the District Ministers (though in fact he would never 
do this except in extreme circumstances). The Liberation Front should not 
embarrass the President or his party by claiming that the formula had 
given them the framework for establishing their separate state in the 
future. Such a posture would be counter-productive; it would rouse the ire 
of the Sinhalese people. 
I had to persuade the leaders of the Liberation Front that what they 
would obtain may not even be a first step towards their goal but that it 
could meet some of their immediate objectives — settling Tamil-speaking 
colonists in the historic homelands of the Sri Lankan Tamils and thereby 
preventing Sinhalese from colonising these areas, besides providing 
employment opportunities for Tamil youth in development schemes. 
There was further the possibility that under the system of proportional 
representation (since no party might obtain a majority in Parliament) the 
Front could use their bargaining position in the future to secure more 
powers for District Development Councils. It was also necessary that the 
scheme should apply to all administrative districts (24 in number) so as not 
to create any impression that it was a special deal intended to satisfy Tamil 
demands for nationhood and sovereign status. 
Above all there was a desperate urgency to work within a time frame, 
viz., (i) the Tamil militants and activists had to be restrained, (ii) the Presi-
dent of the Republic was at the time 74 years of age and only a person of 
his immense stature could assure the Sinhalese people that it was in their 
interest to accommodate the Tamils, and (iii) the scheme had to be 
implemented before the President decided to retire from public life; or else 
it could become the plaything of competing Sinhalese politicians in their 
national pastime of Tamil-baiting. Most importantly, an atmosphere of 
trust had to be created between the President and the leaders of the Libera-
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tion Front; both parties needed to be persuaded that neither should exploit 
the ultimate outcome for narrow political gain. 
The Solution 
The growing internecine warfare between the two communities and the 
mounting tensions in the rapidly shortening intervals were like a cancer 
eating into the vitals of the body politic. Either it had to be arrested or the 
patient would become increasingly enervated. President Jayewardene was 
keenly sensitive to this, remarking once at a meeting where the chairman 
of the President's party, the secretary to the Cabinet and I were present (in 
October 1979) that "long after we are dead and gone this problem will be 
with us and we had therefore better solve it here and now". The remarks 
were made in the context of opposition from the chairman of the party (for 
political reasons) and from the secretary to the Cabinet (for administrative 
reasons) to a formula that had been worked out by the President and 
myself. That formula had oddly enough been thought of by the President 
in Sri Lanka and by myself while in Canada. The President stated that it 
had occurred to him in "a flash", in "a moment of inspiration". 
The occasion for action was when the island had reached a point in 
June-July 1979 when it was on the brink of a total and unmanageable civil 
war. Panic was fast setting in. There were phone messages to me from 
leading personages in the Tamil Jaffna peninsula (which is in the north of 
Sri Lanka and has the highest concentration of Sri Lankan Tamils) to ap-
proach the President with a view to finding a solution. The leaders of the 
Liberation Front did not however make their entry at this point in time. 
An ambassador from a powerful western state had a letter (dated 13 July 
1979) hand delivered to me at my residence in Columbo in which, among 
other things, he urged me to act as a moderating influence. 
The immediate question was to find a way of dealing with a problem 
that would brook of no delay. Here I found the President of the Republic 
not merely cooperative but extremely intellectual at grasping the in-
tricacies of a veritable political imbroglio. It was he and he alone who un-
derstood its ramifications in all its details not merely in relation to the im-
mediate present but in terms of the future. 
The President mentioned the possibility of a special committee of 
ministers from his Cabinet devising a solution. I argued that such a com-
mittee would be acting unilaterally as it would not have a representative 
from the Liberation Front; the President appreciated this response. The 
President then suggested a Round Table Conference to which represen-
tatives from all major political parties would be invited; he hoped that such 
a gathering could hammer out an agreed solution which could later not be 
exploited for mean and parochial party advantage. I dampened the Presi-
dent's enthusiasm pointing out that such a public conference would only 
provide a platform for parties to compete with one another in indicating to 
the Sinhalese ethnic majority how little they were prepared to concede to 
the Tamils; the President was convinced. 
The President then asked me for suggestions. I put forward the follow-
ing proposals: (1) a devolution and decentralisation of powers to each of 
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the 24 administrative districts (6 of which are in the Tamil-speaking areas) 
into which the island is divided; (2) the scheme should be based on the 
model of provincial councils as is in operation in the Republic of South 
Africa — and since the textbooks speak of the South African constitution 
as being neither strictly unitary nor federal, such a scheme would not 
violate the inflexible unitary provisions of the constitution of Sri Lanka; (3) 
each of the South African provincial councils had an Administrator as its 
head appointed by the South African govenment; the Sri Lankan District 
Minister would therefore be the equivalent of the South African Ad-
ministrator; he would have to work with his executive committee; (4) once 
the scheme in its broad outlines was approved by the President, by his 
senior colleagues and by the leaders of the Liberation Front, a presidential 
commission of experts, and others from the major parties could work out 
the details; if the other political parties declined to participate, the com-
mission could be constituted with experts as well as representatives from 
the President's political party (the United National Party) and from the 
Liberation Front. The President requested me to prepare a memorandum 
on the scheme which he said he would discuss with some of his ministers. 
The memorandum contained the proposals already stated. There was 
also provision for an executive committee which would function as a 
cabinet, and an elected council. Emphasis was laid on the councils becom-
ing autonomous bodies for purposes of promoting economic development. 
The President readily seized on the concept of economic development and 
it was he who coined the appellation "District Development Councils." 
The President also wished that the elected members in a council should not 
exceed the members of Parliament for the district who he said should be 
ex-officio members of the council. His reason was a sound one. The coun-
cils should as far as possible not have a majority which was in opposition 
to the majority party or parties in power. There would then be friction. 
Since the councils will be elected at the same time as members of Parlia-
ment, there could be reasonable certainty of a coincidence of interests. The 
President was also keen that members of Parliament should interest 
themselves in development at the grass roots level. The whole scheme ap-
peared attractive to the President. The next day he informed me that he 
had shown it to five of his cabinet ministers and they had given it their ap-
proval. He would next have it considered at a forthcoming meeting of his 
Cabinet. The ministers supported the exercise in its entirety — the scheme, 
the proposal for a presidential commission and the decision to abandon the 
plan for a round table conference or a special committee of the cabinet. 
The next stage was to persuade the opposition parties and the Tamil 
United Liberation Front to cooperate in the exercise. The leaders of the 
Liberation Front were the most important factor in the equation. I addres-
sed the parliamentary group of the Front. Some members were sceptical 
but they were not unwilling to give the scheme a try. The group found it 
hard to accept the bona fides of President Jayewardene. They insisted that 
it was he who for party advantage wrecked the Tamil Federal Party's pact 
of 1957 with S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the prime minister at the time. I 
replied that Winston Churchill had opposed independence for India but he 
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had sent the Cripps Mission to offer dominion status to that country dur-
ing World War II. The group wished to know what would become of their 
demand for a separate sovereign state. I argued that they could do what 
the Indian National Congress had done. In 1929, the Indian National 
Congress had resolved to fight for independence. But the Congress later 
decided, without giving up its goal, to cooperate in the working of the 
Government of India Act of 1935, a measure which fell far short of in-
dependence. In the end the group decided that they would go along with 
the exercise as a measure which would democratise the country's local 
government system. In part, they responded positively because the Indian 
National Congress is their model. They nominated Dr. Neelan 
Tiruchelvam as their representative on the proposed commission. The 
other Opposition parties declined to participate. 
Before the presidential commission was officially appointed on 2 August 
1979, I was involved in considerable bargaining, discussions and negotia-
tions between the two parties before drawing up a set of terms of reference 
for the proposed commission. The terms in the end proved acceptable to 
the President of the Republic and the Liberation Front. In this I was as-
sisted by Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam who by training and profession is a 
lawyer. 
The commission had as its chairman, a retired chief justice, Victor Ten-
nekoon, a Sinhalese Buddhist who had been appointed to the position by 
Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike when she was prime minister during 1970-
77. Victor Tennekoon was by no means convinced that the solution 
proposed by the President was the best. Having a legal mind, he could not 
conceive of a scheme where the chief executive's (that is, the President's) 
agent, the District Minister, could work with an executive committee 
elected by a District Development Council. He therefore advocated that 
the council and its executive committee should act in an advisory capacity 
to the District Minister, a plan which would have been rejected outright by 
the Liberation Front. It is also probable that he as well as the Sinhalese 
members of the commission were under tremendous pressure from 
Sinhalese activists and militants. 
The reluctance of Tennekoon held up the work of the commission for a 
considerable length of time. The commission issued its report only in 
February 1980, whereas the President had expected to have a report by 
the end of September or early October (1979). I had to leave for the 
University of New Brunswick at the end of August (1979) in time for the 
fall semester. The understanding with the President was that I would 
return for a month in October (1979) and finalize a bill to establish District 
Development Councils on the basis of the Commission's report. 
In the end, the President and I, in the month of October (1979) prepared 
an unofficial report and thereafter legislation for the setting up of the 
councils. Dr. Tiruchelvam was helpful. The assistance of the Acting Legal 
Draftsman and the Attorney-General was made available to me on the in-
struction of the President. Sri Lanka's senior constitutional lawyer, Dr. 
Joseph Cooray, read through the document to make certain that there 
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were no problems in the proposed bill. 
When I left Sri Lanka for Canada at the end of October, President 
Jayewardene was confident that legislation could be enacted in the beginn-
ing of 1980. He stated that he intended to bring the councils into operation 
on 13 April (1980), an auspicious day for Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil 
Hindus (who constitued the overwhelming majorities in their respective 
populations) for it was the day of their new year. Unfortunately this was 
not possible because of the delay in the commission issuing its report. 
Legislation was finally enacted in August 1980. Thereafter further legisla-
tion became necessary to regulate elections to the councils. The councils 
came into being in July 1981. 
The delay had its consequences. What might have been accepted in 
December 1979 or even April 1980 by the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils 
was jibbed at by the militant and activist youth of the community. They 
looked on it as being too little and too late. In fact the legislation was 
already too late by more than twenty years if the date on which the first 
pact (1957) that was signed between the Tamil Federal Party and the 
prime minister of the time is taken into consideration. Nevertheless 
despite the disappointments and frustrations in the intervening years 
(1957-1979), I was assured by members of the extreme wing of the Libera-
tion Front that April 1980 would not be too late. By July 1981 however 
opinion had changed among sections of the Sri Lankan Tamils. An at-
mosphere of doubt and despair prevailed. The Liberation Front however 
went along with the legislation in the hope that something could be 
retrieved from the situation. The verdict of history could be something dif-
ferent. 
Conclusion 
Between the date of the appointment of the presidential commission in 
August 1979 and the inauguration almost two years later of District 
Development Councils in July 1981, a great many things happened to sully 
the air. A state of emergency was declared in the heavily Tamil populated 
Jaffna peninsula in the north of Sri Lanka5 just before the commission was 
appointed because of a series of killings of policemen and others by Tamil 
militants. The emergency only worsened relations between the two com-
munities because of violence against the civilian population by the state's 
security forces. On the other hand without the emergency, the island 
would have erupted in dangerous civil war. The emergency ended in 
December 1979. But there was a recrudescence of political violence in the 
Jaffna peninsula. It reached a climax in Jaffna with the elections to the 
District Development Councils in June 1981. The army and the police 
perpetrated acts in Jaffna which can in living memory never be erased. 
It was my vain hope that my role would be over with the inauguration 
of the councils. But the violence of June 1981 and the implementational 
aspects of the District Development Councils legislation resulted in further 
calls on my services. On the former, on 22 June 1981, the President of Sri 
Lanka wrote "We have now to re-build the fences that have been broken. 
I am waiting for your arrival." On the latter, the Leader of the Liberation 
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Front in a communication dated 19 August 1981 to the President stated: 
"I am sending this letter in order to recapitulate some of the matters Your 
Excellency discussed with Professor A.J. Wilson and agreed to." On 31 
August 1981, an Accord which I negotiated between the President and the 
Liberation Front was signed by the President. An outcome of the Accord 
was the convening of a high level committee comprising the President, the 
Prime Minister, key cabinet ministers and the leaders of the Liberation 
Front, including Dr. Tiruchelvam. This committee has met at regular in-
tervals since and issues in conflict have been satisfactorily resolved. 
There is still scepticism among sections of the articulate Tamil intel-
ligentsia as to whether District Development Councils will provide the Sri 
Lankan Tamils with the much needed autonomy which could be an alter-
native to internecine conflict and an all embracing popular movement for a 
separate Tamil state. The future can be determined but its determining de-
pends on the way in which the Colombo-centred bureaucracy and 
ministers of the government adhere to the spirit of the law, not its letter. 
The President's continuing presence is indispensable. But after him? 
Remarks made to the ambassador of a super power in October 1979 still 
hold true: "You cannot expect me to solve a 2500 year quarrel between 
Sinhalese and Tamils in one week." On the other hand the senior diplomat 
of a friendly state struck a more optimistic note. In a letter to me on 25 
February 1980, he wrote: "I am quite clear in my mind that the whole ex-
ercise was worth the effort, and the gallons of soda water you downed in 
my house is no price at all for what has been achieved.. .1 put it to you that 
this is no small achievement. . ." Only time can tell.6 
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